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Abstract. In this work, we study how to securely evaluate the value
of trading data without requiring a trusted third party. We focus on
the important machine learning task of classification. This leads us to
propose a provably secure four-round protocol that computes the value
of the data to be traded without revealing the data to the potential
acquirer. The theoretical results demonstrate a number of important
properties of the proposed protocol. In particular, we prove the security
of the proposed protocol in the honest-but-curious adversary model.
Keywords: Secure two party feature selection · Feature selection · Clas-
sification · Privacy preserving data mining · Homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
According to the report “Data Never Sleeps 6.0” published recently by Domo
Inc., an estimated 1.7 MB of data will be created every second for each person on
earth by 2020. The owners of this staggering amount of data sometimes provide
it readily to others, but often hold back despite the value that data trading
could provide. Both privacy concerns and the desire to monetize data at a fair
market value are barriers, as both could be compromised if data are revealed
before terms have been negotiated. A method to assess the value of a data trade
without first revealing the data would help make data trading a more efficient
transaction, whether the aim is to trade at a fair market price, apply some type
of differential privacy, or both.
Finding business value in ‘distributed’ data: When data on different aspects of
a system are captured by different stakeholders, trading the data can provide a
more complete perspective of the system. For instance, in an Internet-of-Things
(IoT) ecosystem, IoT devices owned by different parties (manufacturers, service
providers, consumers, etc.) often collect data that reveal only a partial under-
standing of behaviors and events. Creating a marketplace for trading the data
would enable a party to get a more complete understanding when required, with-
out spending extra time and money deploying additional IoT devices to collect
data that another party already has. As long as stakeholders can establish a fair
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price for the data, inefficient duplication of efforts can be avoided, benefiting
both parties of a transaction. However, identifying trade partners and tagging a
cash value to the data can be a tricky challenge, particularly because the value
depends on the quality and content of the data held by both partners.
Maximizing data utility while protecting individual privacy: When considering
how to share sensitive datasets, potential collaborators may seek to analyze
how different statistical privacy options affect the utility of data. The party
applying statistical privacy to their data before sharing may like to work with a
potential collaborator to experiment with different choices of statistical privacy
methods and parameters, in order to deliver desensitized data of the highest
possible utility. Applications include both business-to-business transactions and
business-to-government transactions.
Data trading scenarios: An owner of a dataset may want to release only subsets
of their data to control proliferation, but they need a way to determine utility
of subsets in order to choose the right one for each potential collaborator. An
owner may also want to limit the number of times data are shared, either to
mitigate security and privacy risks or to maintain a desired monetary price for
access to the data. Choosing customers that have the highest utility for the data
will help maximize monetary return, as those customers will in principle pay a
higher price. An owner may want to sell access to data at a full value-based price,
but rational purchasers may insist on a discounted price to compensate for any
risk associated with uncertain utility. Thus, answering the following question is
important:
How can one securely measure utility of data and the impact of
applying statistical privacy enhancement techniques, without access to
the actual data?
1.1 This Work
In this work, we try to answer the above question for a specific potential ac-
quirer’s task, where the parties freely share data dictionaries. Specifically, we
provide a protocol with which a potential provider and a potential acquirer can
determine the value of the data with respect to the latter’s task at hand, without
the latter learning anything more about the data, other than its specification in
the data dictionary. The specific sub-case we consider is the provider having a
binary feature vector and the acquirer having a binary class vector. The acquirer
would like to learn if the provider’s feature vector can improve the correctness
of the acquirer’s classification. Thus, the utility we consider is whether the data
shared by the provider is expected to improve the classification of the acquirer’s
existing dataset. To quantify utility, we use the χ2-statistic studied by Yang and
Pederson (1997) for the related problem of feature selection. We employ Pallier
homomorphic encryption for the required privacy-preserving computations.
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1.2 Roadmap
The protocols in this paper assume parties share primary keys for their data, in
order for data elements to be aligned. In future work, we will integrate private set
intersection protocols, such as the Practical Private Set Intersection Protocols
published by De Cristofaro and Tsudik [7], in order to relax this assumption. We
also plan to study extensions of the work to more sophisticated feature selection,
based on combining multiple columns in the provider’s dataset to generate more
complex feature candidates.
2 Background
In this work, we consider a structured dataset, and we are interested in classifi-
cation based on all the features available. Specifically, we consider two parties,
Carol and Felix. Carol has a dataset consisting of certain feature columns and a
class vector generated from her available features. Felix possesses an additional
feature column f that might be useful for Carol in improving the classification
of her dataset.
Notations. Let c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) be the class label vector with Carol, and f =
(f1, f2, . . . , fn) be the feature vector with Felix. We assume both the class labels
and the features are binary attributes, leaving generalization to multinomial
classifiers for a future paper. That is, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ci ∈ {0, 1} and fi ∈ {0, 1}.
Let ci denote the class variable of the i-th record in Carol’s dataset. Let fi be
the feature value, in Felix’s feature vector, corresponding to the i-th record in
Carol’s dataset.
2.1 χ2 Feature Selection
Feature selection is the process of removing non-informative features and se-
lecting a subset of features that are useful to build a good predictor [14]. The
criteria for feature selection vary among applications. For example, Pearson cor-
relation coefficients are often used to detect dependencies in linear regressions,
and mutual information and χ2 statistics are commonly used to rank discrete or
nominal features [14,23].
In this paper, we focus on determining utility of binary features. We choose χ2
statistics as a measure of utility, due to its wide applicability and its amenability
towards cryptographic tools. More specifically, unlike mutual information which
involves logarithmic computations, the calculation of χ2 statistics only involves
additions and multiplications.
For the class label vector c and the corresponding feature vector f , A is defined
to be the number of rows with fi = 0 and ci = 0. B is defined to be the number
of rows with fi = 0 and ci = 1. C is defined to be the number of rows with fi = 1
and ci = 0. D is defined to be the number of rows with fi = 1 and ci = 1. Table 1
shows the two-way contingency table for f and c. The χ2 statistic of f and c is
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defined [23] to be:
χ2(f , c) =
n(AD− BC)2
(A+ C)(A + B)(C+ D)(B+ D)
.
Table 1. Two-Way Contingency Table of f and c
f
c
0 1
0 A B
1 C D
χ2(f , c) is used to test the independence of f and c. Table 2 shows the confidence
of rejecting the independence hypothesis under different χ2 values. For example,
when χ2(f , c) is larger than 10.83, the independence hypothesis can be rejected
with more than 99.9% confidence, indicating that the feature vector f is very
likely to be correlated with the class label vector c.
Table 2. Confidence of Rejecting the Hypothesis of Independence under Different χ2
Values
χ2 (f , c) Confidence
10.83 99.9%
7.88 99.5%
6.63 99%
3.84 95%
2.71 90%
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
PKE scheme and CPA security. We recall the standard definitions of public-
key encryption (PKE) schemes and chosen plaintext attack (CPA) security,
which are used in this paper.
PKE schemes. A scheme PKE with message spaceM consists of three probabilistically-
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms Gen,Enc,Dec. Key generation algorithm Gen(1k)
outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk . Encryption algorithm Enc(pk ,m)
takes pk and a message m ∈ M, and outputs a ciphertext c. Decryption algo-
rithm Dec(sk , c) takes sk and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m. For cor-
rectness, we require that Dec(sk , c) = m for all m ∈ M, all (pk , sk)← Gen(1k),
and all c← Enc(pk ,m).
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Negligible Function. A function f : N → R is negligible if for every possible
integer c, there exists an integer N such that for all x > N , |f(x)| ≤ 1
xc
. We
denote negligible functions as negl(·).
The CPA Experiment. We now describe the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
game with an adversary A against a PKE scheme PKE.
Algorithm 1 The PubKCPAA,PKE Experiment
Input: Security parameter k
1: (pk , sk)← Gen(1k)
2: The adversary A is given 1k, pk , and oracle access to Encpk(·). A outputs a pair of
messages (m0,m1) of the same length
3: A uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen, and c ← Encpk(mb) is given to A
4: A continues to have access to Encpk(·), and outputs a bit b
′
Output: 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise
CPA Security [16]. A PKE scheme PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) has indistinguish-
able encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack, or is CPA-secure, if for all
probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A there is a negligible function negl
such that
Pr
[
PubKCPAA,PKE (k) = 1
]
≤
1
2
+ negl(k),
where the experiment PubKCPAA,PKE is defined in Algorithm 1, and the probability
is taken over the randomness of A and of the experiment.
Paillier Encryption. We use Paillier encryption to maintain privacy in our
two-party feature selection algorithm, and employ the additive homomorphic
property of Paillier encryption to calculate the χ2 statistics that quantify feature
utility. We recall the Paillier encryption scheme in Figure 1 [16].
Note that while we use Paillier homomorphic encryption, the proposed proto-
cols can accomodate any semantically secure additively homomorphic encryption
scheme.
Paillier encryption supports additive and scalar multiplication homomor-
phism. We briefly recall the definitions of additive homomorphism and scalar
multiplication homomorphism [16].
Additive Homomorphism. A PKE scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is said to
be additively homomorphic, if there exists a binary operation ⊕, such that the
following holds for all k ∈ N , and for all m1,m2 ∈M,
Pr

m∗ = m1 +m2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pk , sk)← Gen(1k)
c1 ← Encpk (m1), c2 ← Encpk (m2)
c∗ ← c1 ⊕ c2
m∗ ← Decsk (c
∗)

 = 1− negl(k).
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Paillier Encryption Scheme Let GenModulus be a polynomial-time algorithm that,
on input 1k, outputs (N, p, q) where N = pq and p and q are k-bit primes (except
p or q is not prime with probability negligible in k). Define the following encryption
scheme:
– Gen: on input 1k run GenModulus (1k) to obtain (N, p, q). The public key is
pk = N , and the private key is sk = 〈N,φ(N)〉, where φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
– Enc: on input of a public key N and a message m ∈ ZN , choose a uniformly
random r ← Z∗N and output the ciphertext
c := [(1 +N)m · rN mod N2].
– Dec: on input of a private key 〈N,φ(N)〉 and a ciphertext c, compute
m :=
[
[cφ(N) mod N2]− 1
N
· φ(N)−1 mod N
]
.
Fig. 1. Paillier Encryption Scheme.
Scalar Multiplication Homomorphism. A PKE scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc,
Dec) is said to be scalar multiplication homomorphic, if there exists a binary
operation ⊗, such that the following holds for all k ∈ N , and for allm1,m2 ∈M,
Pr

m∗ = m1m2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(pk , sk)← Gen(1k)
c← Encpk (m2)
c∗ ← m1 ⊗ c
m∗ ← Decsk (c
∗)

 = 1− negl(k).
3 Proof of Privacy
We first present the high-level argument for how our protocols will protect each
party’s data. We have one of the parties (Carol) choose the encryption key, and
encrypt her data using this key before sending it to the other party (Felix). Thus,
Carol’s privacy will be guaranteed by the semantic security assumption of the
encryption scheme. Meanwhile, Felix will also encrypt his data using Carol’s key,
but he will blind all of the outputs he sends to Carol with randomness of his
choosing, ensuring that Carol can learn nothing about his data. We now make
these notions precise by first providing a formal definition of privacy protection
in the honest-but-curious adversary model, and a formal proof of privacy for the
protocol that attempts to protect privacy in the above described manner.
Definition 1 (Honest-but-curious security of two-party protocol). We
begin with the following notation:
– Let gc and gf be probabilistic polynomial-time functionalities and let Π be a
two-party protocol for computing g = (gc, gf). Let the parties be Carol,Felix,
with inputs c,f respectively.
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– The view of the party A ∈ {Carol,Felix} during an execution of Π on (c, f)
and security parameter k is denoted by viewΠA (c, f , k) and equals (w, r
A,mA1 , . . . ,m
A
t ),
where w ∈ {c, f} (w’s value depending on the value of A), rA equals the con-
tents of the party A’s internal random tape, and mAj represents the j-th
message that it received.
– The output of the party A during an execution of Π on (c, f) and security
parameter k is denoted by outputΠA (c, f , k) and can be computed from its own
view of the execution.
Let g = (gc, gf ) be a functionality. We say that Π securely computes g in the
presence of semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms Sc and Sf such that
{(Sc(1
k, c, gc(c, f)), g(c, f))}c,f ,k ∼= {(view
Π
Carol(c, f , k), output
Π(c, f , k))}c,f ,k(1)
{(Sf (1
k, f , gf (c, f)), g(c, f))}c,f ,k ∼= {(view
Π
Felix(c, f , k), output
Π(c, f , k))}c,f ,k(2)
c, f ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that |c| = |f |, and k ∈ N.
4 Protocol
In this section, we describe a four -round protocol for χ2 statistic calculation
under a two-party setting. For convenience, we continue to refer to the parties
as Carol, who has the class vector c, and Felix, who has the feature vector f .
Carol’s objective is to learn χ2(f , c) and Felix’s objective is to not reveal any fur-
ther information about f while Carol computes the utility of Felix’s data for her
classifier. In this section, Felix uses multiplicative binding to keep the detailed
mathematics a little simpler, but an alternative protocol that uses additive blind-
ing is provided in Section 6 for situations where the security of multiplicative
blinding is a concern.
As before, A is the number of rows with fi = 0 and ci = 0. B is the number of
rows with fi = 0 and ci = 1. C is the number of rows with fi = 1 and ci = 0. D is
the number of rows with fi = 1 and ci = 1.
Round 1.
Carol performs the following operations:
1. Generate a Paillier key pair (pk , sk) = Gen(1k).
2. Encrypt all class labels with pk : Encpk (c1),Encpk (c2), . . . ,Encpk (cn).
3. Compute B+D
A+C . Note that Carol can obtain this value by computing
∑
n
i=1
ci
n−(
∑
n
i=1
ci)
,
since B + D =
∑n
i=1 ci and A + C = n − (B + D), based on the contingency
table.
4. Encrypt B+D
A+C with pk : Encpk
(
B+D
A+C
)
.
5. Send the following values to Felix:
(
pk ,Encpk (c1),Encpk (c2), . . . ,Encpk (cn),Encpk
(
B+ D
A+ C
))
.
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Round 2.
Felix performs the following operations:
1. Compute Encpk (D). Note that Felix can obtain this value by computing
⊕n
i=1
(fi ⊗ Encpk (ci)) =⊕
n
i=1
Encpk (fici) = Encpk (
∑n
i=1 fici),
since
∑n
i=1 fici = D.
2. Sample r ← ZN , and compute r ⊗ Encpk (D) = Encpk (rD).
3. Send the following value to Carol:
Encpk (rD)
Round 3.
Carol performs the following operations:
1. Decrypt Encpk (rD) using sk .
2. Compute r
2
D
2
(B+D)(A+C) and
rD
A+C , and encrypt them.
3. Send the following values to Felix:(
Encpk
(
r2D2
(B+ D)(A + C)
)
,Encpk
(
rD
A+ C
))
.
Round 4.
Felix performs the following operations:
1. Cancel r by computing
r−2 ⊗ Encpk
(
r2D2
(B+ D)(A+ C)
)
= Encpk
(
D
2
(B + D)(A+ C)
)
and
r−1 ⊗ Encpk
(
rD
A+ C
)
= Encpk
(
D
A+ C
)
.
2. Compute an encryption of χ2(f , c) by computing:(
n3
(A+ B)(C+ D)
⊗ Encpk
(
D
2
(B+ D)(A+ C)
))
⊕
(
n(C+ D)
A+ B
⊗ Encpk
(
B+ D
A+ C
))
⊕
(
−2n2
A+ B
⊗ Encpk
(
D
A + C
))
,
where C+ D and A+ B are computed as
C+ D =
n∑
i=1
fi,
and
A+ B = n− (C+ D).
We see below that the above computation gives Encpk (χ
2(f , c)). Since AD−
BC = (A+B+C+D)D− (B+D)(C+D), χ2(f , c) can be decomposed as follows:
χ2(f , c) =
n(AD− BC)2
(A+ C)(A + B)(C+ D)(B+ D)
=
n3
(A+ B)(C + D)
D
2
(B + D)(A+ C)
+
n(C+ D)
(A+ B)
(B+ D)
(A+ C)
−
2n2
(A+ B)
D
(A+ C)
.
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3. Send the following value to Carol:
Encpk (χ
2(f , c)).
Local computation.
Carol decrypts Encpk (χ
2(f , c)) to obtain χ2(f , c).
Remark 1. We note that only Carol receives the value χ2(f , c). Depending on
the application, if Felix also needs to know the value of χ2(f , c), Carol can simply
then send it to Felix after running the protocol.
Remark 2. If Felix needs to know the value of χ2(f , c) but does not trust Carol to
send the true value, then the parties can use a two-stream protocol wherein both
parties compute and send encrypted values in round one and both parties send
encrypted values of χ2(f , c) in round four. Since the computation for χ2(f , c) is
symmetric with respect to c and f, both parties should end up with the same
value of χ2(f , c), assuming they used the same data in both streams (i.e., did
not cheat). To verify that the parties did not cheat, they can re-encrypt their
χ2(f , c) values with a new, single-use key, send their re-encrypted χ2(f , c) to
the other party, and then send the one-use key after receiving the re-encrypted
χ2(f , c) message from the other party. If cheating occurred, the decrypted value
of the other party’s χ2(f , c) will not match their own.
5 Proof of Security
With respect to the notion of security specified in Definition 1, we first prove the
following key lemma that will allow us to argue that our two-party protocol is
secure against an honest-but-curious adversary. Specifically, the lemma captures
the crux of proof, and its extension to the main theorem is straightforward.
Lemma 1. Suppose that in a two-party protocol Π ′, Carol runs the key genera-
tion algorithm of a CPA-secure homomorphic public-key encryption scheme and
gives the public key to Felix. Also, suppose that all messages sent from Carol to
Felix are encrypted with the generated public key, and all messages sent from
Felix to Carol are either encryptions of elements randomly distributed in the
plaintext space and independent of Felix’s inputs, or encryptions of the final out-
put. Then, the protocol Π is secure in the honest-but-curious adversary model.
Proof. To prove the security of the protocol, we need to consider two cases –
one, where Carol is corrupted, and the other, where Felix is corrupted. In each
case, we will prove that the corrupted party will not learn anything more about
the other party’s output than the protocol output. Specifically, we show that
there exist PPT algorithms Sc and Sf , that simulate the non-corrupted party’s
messages without knowing the non-corrupted party’s inputs but only knowing
the output, in cases where Carol and Felix are corrupted, respectively. This
corresponds to establishing equations (1) and (2) in Definition 1.
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Case 1: When Felix is corrupted by an adversary. We show how to simulate
Carol’s messages sent to Felix, by describing the simulator Sf . For every ci-
phertext to be sent from Carol to Felix, Sf chooses a random plaintext in the
message space and sends an encryption of it. If Felix can tell apart the views of
communicating with Carol and with the simulator, then there exists an adver-
sary that can break CPA security of the underlying encryption scheme. Since,
by assumption, no such PPT adversary exists, we have that Equation (2) holds.
Case 2: When Carol is corrupted by an adversary. We show how to simulate
Felix’s messages sent to Carol, by describing the simulator Sc. For every ci-
phertext that encrypts a randomly distributed plaintext, sent by Felix to Carol,
Sc samples a uniform random element in the plaintext space, encrypts it with
Carol’s public key, and sends the resulting ciphertext to Carol. For the ciphertext
encrypting the final output, note that Sc gets the final output as an input. Using
this, the simulator can compute its encryption, and send the resulting ciphertext
to Carol. Since the messages sent by Sc to Carol are distributed identically to
Felix’s messages to Carol, we have that Equation (1) holds.
We will now simply extend the core lemma into the main theorem.
Theorem 1. The two-party protocol Π described in Section 4 is secure in the
honest-but-curious adversarial model.
Proof. We note the following aspects in the protocol Π . All the messages sent
from Carol to Felix are encrypted using Carol’s public key under Paillier en-
cryption scheme. The messages sent from Felix to Carol are either encryptions
of elements randomly distributed in ZN , the plaintext space, or encryption of the
final output, χ2(f , c). Since these aspects conform to the conditions in Lemma 1,
based on the lemma, we have that the protocol Π is secure in the honest-but-
curious adversary model.
6 Alternative Protocol
In this section, we describe an alternative protocol for χ2 statistic calculation
under a two-party setting, wherein Felix uses additive blinding rather than mul-
tiplicative blinding to introduce the random number r. In theory, taking ad-
vantage of additive rather than multiplicative homomorphism provides stronger
security [5], albeit at a cost in computational efficiency and complexity. For this
alternative protocol, round one is unchanged:
Round 1.
Carol performs the same operations as in Round 1 of section 4, including sending
the following values to Felix:(
pk ,Encpk (c1),Encpk (c2), . . . ,Encpk (cn),Encpk
(
B+ D
A+ C
))
.
Round 2.
Felix performs the following operations:
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1. Compute Encpk (D). Note that Felix can obtain this value by computing
⊕n
i=1
(fi ⊗ Encpk (ci)) =⊕
n
i=1
Encpk (fici) = Encpk (
∑n
i=1 fici),
since
∑n
i=1 fici = D.
2. Sample r ← ZN , and compute r ⊕ Encpk (D) = Encpk (r + D).
3. Send the following value to Carol:
Encpk (r + D)
Round 3.
Carol performs the following computations.
1. Decrypt Encpk (r + D) using sk .
2. Compute five values:
(r+D)2
(B+D)(A+C) ,
(r+D)
(B+D)(A+C) ,
(r+D)
(A+C) ,
1
(B+D)(A+C) and
1
A+C ,
and encrypt them, obtaining:
Encpk
(
(r+D)2
(B+D)(A+C)
)
, Encpk
(
(r+D)
(B+D)(A+C)
)
, Encpk
(
(r+D)
(A+C)
)
, Encpk
(
1
(B+D)(A+C)
)
and
Encpk
(
1
A+C
)
.
3. Send the five encrypted values to Felix.
Round 4.
Felix performs the following computations.
1. Eliminate r from the first and third encrypted values by computing
Encpk
(
(r + D)2
(B+ D)(A + C)
)
⊕
(
r2 ⊗ Encpk
(
1
(B+ D)(A + C)
))
⊕
(
−2r ⊗ Encpk
(
(r + D)
(B+ D)(A + C)
))
= Encpk
(
D
2
(B+ D)(A+ C)
)
and
Encpk
(
(r + D)
(A+ C)
)
⊕
(
−r ⊗ Encpk
(
1
(A+ C)
))
= Encpk
(
D
(A + C)
)
.
2. Compute an encryption of χ2(f , c) by computing:
(
n3
(A+ B)(C+ D)
⊗ Encpk
(
D
2
(B+ D)(A+ C)
))
⊕
(
n(C+ D)
A+ B
⊗ Encpk
(
B+ D
A+ C
))
⊕
(
−2n2
A+ B
⊗ Encpk
(
D
A + C
))
,
where C+ D and A+ B are computed as
C+ D =
n∑
i=1
fi,
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and
A+ B = n− (C+ D).
We see below that the above computation gives Encpk (χ
2(f , c)). Since AD−
BC = (A+B+C+D)D− (B+D)(C+D), χ2(f , c) can be decomposed as follows:
χ2(f , c) =
n(AD− BC)2
(A+ C)(A + B)(C+ D)(B+ D)
=
n3
(A+ B)(C + D)
D
2
(B + D)(A+ C)
+
n(C+ D)
(A+ B)
(B+ D)
(A+ C)
−
2n2
(A+ B)
D
(A+ C)
.
3. Send the following value to Carol:
Encpk (χ
2(f , c)).
Local computation.
Carol decrypts Encpk (χ
2(f , c)) to obtain χ2(f , c).
7 Related Work
There has been extensive research on privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM),
which aims at completing data mining tasks on a union of several private datasets,
each owned by a different party. The goal of PPDM can be achieved by either
adding noise and perturbations [2,9] or using cryptographic tools. This paper
falls into the latter category.
General SMPC [24,13,12,15,18,4] can be used to calculate any functions
between multiple parties without revealing the input of each party. However,
currently-known general SMPC protocols are computationally inefficient. There-
fore, it is impractical to do large-scale multi-party feature selection using these
protocols. Compared to general SMPC protocols, the protocol proposed in this
paper is more efficient in handling feature selection.
Recent studies have proposed several efficient SMPC protocols to accom-
plish different data mining tasks such as statistics computations [8,6], set in-
tersections [10,1], classification [21,17,20,22], clustering [19], and regression [11].
However, to the best of our knowledge, not much research has been done in
secure multi-party feature selection. As a commonly-used pre-processing tech-
nique, feature selection can be used in conjunction with many of the previously
mentioned SMPC data mining protocols or as a metric to estimate data quality
for classification tasks.
There are many feature selection methods. [8] proposes an algorithm for
privacy-preserving calculation of Pearson correlation coefficients among distributed
parties. However, different from our approach, they use perturbation techniques
to achieve privacy protection. [3] proposes a secure multi-party feature selec-
tion protocol using virtual dimensionality reduction, but their protocol requires
users to exchange unencrypted intermediate results such as the dot product of
two attribute vectors. Our protocol achieves a stronger privacy protection: each
participating party only learns the χ2 coefficient between the two attributes, and
no intermediate results are leaked.
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8 Conclusion
Data trading will become more and more important as devices generate more
and more data. In this work, we initiate a study on how to securely evaluate the
value of trading data without requiring a trusted third party, by considering the
specific case of data classification tasks. We present a secure four-round protocol
that computes the value of the data to be traded without revealing the data to
the potential acquirer.
We employed additive homomorphic encryption as a core building block to
compute the χ2-statistic in a privacy-preserving manner.
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